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Abstract
Combinatorial auctions represent sophisticated
market mechanisms that are becoming increasingly
important in various business applications due to their
ability to improve economic efficiency and auction
revenue, especially in settings where participants tend
to exhibit more complex user preferences and
valuations. While recent studies on such auctions have
found heterogeneity in bidder behavior and its varying
effect on auction outcomes, the area of bidder behavior
and its impact on economic outcomes in combinatorial
auctions is still largely underexplored. One of the main
reasons is that it is nearly impossible to control for the
type of bidder behavior in real world or experimental
auction setups. We propose an agent-based modeling
approach to replicate human bidder behavior in
continuous combinatorial auctions and leverage our
agents to simulate a wide variety of competition types,
including experimentally unobserved ones that could
not otherwise be studied. The capabilities of the
proposed approach enable more comprehensive studies
(via richer controlled experiments) of bidding behavior
in the complex and highly dynamic decision
environment of continuous combinatorial auctions.

1. Introduction
Combinatorial auctions [1] are important market
mechanisms that allow bidders to bid on individual
items as well as their combinations (bundles), which can
lead to more efficient allocation of resources in complex
market environments. While there has been research on
a number of topics in this area – e.g., winner
determination in combinatorial auctions, combinatorial
auction designs, practicality of these designs for online
marketplaces, and comparison of different auction
mechanisms – the important issues related to bidder
behavior in these auctions have been largely
underexplored [2, 3]. The main difficulty is that it is not
possible to control for bidder behavior in experimental
studies, which makes it hard to address a number of
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important and interesting research questions, for
example, understanding how bidder behavior changes
when facing different types of competition, and how
these changes affect auction outcomes. In this paper, we
use a data-driven approach to design and develop
software agents that replicate human behavior in this
complex trading mechanism. Our approach draws upon,
but differs from, existing research on automated bidding
agents [4-6] in that our agents are intended to replicate
human bidding behavior, not to outperform human
participants, compete against other agents, or optimize
a given task. We leverage the agent-based modeling [711] approach to examine the effect of different bidder
compositions (i.e., interaction of bidders with different
bidding strategies) on auction outcomes and bidder
behavior, using the case of continuous combinatorial
auctions. Findings from our computational agent-based
simulations allow for bottom-up theorizing [12] on the
interaction of bidder behaviors and emerging auction
outcomes.

2. Background: continuous combinatorial
auctions
In combinatorial auctions bidders can bid on a single
item or a bundle. At any time in the auction, any bid that
has been submitted by an auction participant can be in
one of three states: (a) winning, (b) dead, i.e., no chance
of winning in the future, or (c) live, i.e., not currently
dead or winning but may change to one these states
depending on future bids. This is substantially different
from single-item auctions where a bid can only be either
winning or dead. Bids on non-overlapping bundles that
create the highest revenue are winning bids, which are
recalculated upon any new incoming bid. Given the
three possible states of a bid, there are naturally two
important bidding levels for any bundle b at any given
time in an auction: deadness level (DL) and winning
level (WL), where 𝐷𝐿(𝑏) ≤ 𝑊𝐿(𝑏). A bid amount
above the WL will make a bid winning, below the DL
will result in a dead bid, and a bid amount in-between
DL and WL will result in a live bid. Auction revenue
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Figure 1. Symmetric valuation setup

(or auctioneer revenue) is the amount obtained by the
auctioneer via the winning bids, which equals the sum
of winning bids’ amounts in a first-price auction
mechanism. Another important auction outcome is
allocative efficiency, which measures how optimally
items are distributed at the end of an auction and is
Total Valuation of Auction Winners
defined as: Maximum Possible Total Valuation .
Higher allocative efficiency is often stated as a desirable
goal in auction literature, because it leads to greater
social welfare [1]. The reason for this is that allocative
efficiency is maximized when items are acquired by
bidders who value them the most.
In this paper we use the following experimental
continuous combinatorial auction (CCA) setup first
introduced by Adomavicius and Gupta [13] as well as
the dataset collected in their study [14], referred to as
the “baseline experimental data” in the rest of the paper,
to illustrate the proposed agent-based approach. In this
setup, three bidders compete to acquire six items,
representing six real-estate properties around a lake. A
systematic valuation scheme is used where each bidder
is designated a focal item, which has the highest value
for that bidder among all items. The remaining items’
value decreases by 50% the farther they are from the
focal item (Figure 1). Complementarities are defined
among items by adding a super-additive valuation of
10% for each adjoining item in a bundle. For example,
if a bundle consists of focal item A ($100 value), its
neighbor item B ($50 value), and B’s neighbor C ($25
value), then the valuation for bundle “ABC” is ($100 +
$50 + $25) × (1 + 0.1 + 0.1) = $210, since there are
two adjoining items in this bundle. Bidders are provided
comprehensive information feedback throughout the
auction, i.e., they can see bids placed so far in the
auction, the provisional winning allocation at the current
auction state, and the WL and DL for any bundle of
interest. Since there are six items in each auction there
are 63 possible bundles, i.e., all possible subsets of 6
items except for the empty set.
Using cluster analysis of bids and clicks generated
by bidders, three stable bidder strategies/types have
been identified in prior work [14], namely: Analyzers
(A), Participators (P), and Explorers (E). These bidder
types were shown to exhibit different behaviors in terms

of several bidder-specific outcome variables (see Table
1 for cluster means and standard deviations):
 Bids: the number of bids placed by a bidder
throughout the auction;
 Spans: the number of distinct bundles a bidder bids on
throughout the auction;
 Surplus: the difference between a bidder’s valuation
and his/her winning bids upon auction end, i.e., a
bidder’s valuation for the won bundles minus the
amount s/he has to pay for them;
 Effort: average number of clicks per bid during an
auction, representing the level of information seeking
effort by the bidder prior to submitting a bid (e.g., in
terms of looking at DLs and WLs of various potential
bundles of interest).
Analyzers (A) are the most rational bidders who
spend more effort on analyzing the auction progress.
Compared to the other two bidder types, a typical
Analyzer places fewer bids on a smaller set of bundles
for which s/he has higher valuation, and derives higher
surplus as a result. Participators (P) do not spend much
effort investigating the auction progress and maintain a
participatory behavior. A typical Participator places
more bids than Analyzers on a wider variety of bundles
and derives a lower surplus than Analyzers, but higher
surplus than Explorers. Explorers (E) spent the least
effort on analyzing the auction environment and can
display very random behavior. Compared to the other
two types, a typical Explorer places the most bids on
wider variety of bundles and derives the lowest surplus.
Since three bidders can participate in each auction
and there are three different bidder types (A, P, and E),
there can be 10 different possible bidder type
combinations in a simple auction; we refer to these
combinations of competing bidders as competition
types. Only 3 out of these 10 possible competition types
had enough observations in the baseline experimental
CCAs to be included in statistical analysis.

3. Modeling canonical bidder behaviors
In a typical CCA, at any time in the auction a bidder
can select a bundle s/he is interested in, check the DL
and WL for the selected bundle, and decide to either
place a bid of a certain monetary amount on the selected
bundle or to not bid at this time. By analyzing the
experimental bid-level and clickstream-level data, we
observe different temporal bidding patterns for the three
bidder types and characterize these behaviors in terms
of “how often they bid at any auction state” (bidding
frequency), “what they bid on” (bundle selection), and
“how much they bid on a selected bundle” (bid
amount). Other possible criteria were examined as well,
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation for bidder specific variables in baseline experimental data
Bidder Type Number of Instances
Bids
Spans
Surplus
Effort
Analyzer

4

15.50

(6.61)

8.00

(3.56)

77.50 (50.08) 32.97

(26.20)

Participator

34

23.06

Explorer

7

(8.84)

9.88

(3.67)

47.26 (44.65) 17.45

(8.61)

52.86 (16.88)

21.57

(4.89)

31.79 (28.45) 11.15

(3.86)

but were ruled out for the purposes of this study, since
they were either explainable in terms of the three above
criteria or did not add significant value for our modeling
purposes in terms of explaining the observed behavior.
For example, bidders’ “effort” is not explicitly modeled
as a factor because the number of clicks indicates effort
that has been exerted by a human bidder in order to
explore the bidding environment before placing a bid,
whereas the bidding environment is straightforwardly
available to software agents. Or, “how quickly” a bid is
placed is not included in the modelling of bidding agents
because the overall bidding patterns are already
captured by the bidding frequency parameter. This is
advantageous, because it allows to straightforwardly
scale the bidding dynamics to any desired auction
duration. This feature is especially important for auction
experiments that involve human participants as some of
the bidders. For pure simulation-based experiments
reported in this paper (i.e., where all auction participants
are software agents), the actual “real-world” auction
duration is not as meaningful. It is important to note that
we model for the three distinct behaviors and the
differences in temporal bidding patterns, not merely the
bidder-specific outcome variables (i.e., Bids, Spans, and
Surplus) that were used to identify, a posteriori,
different bidding strategies. The bidding agents are
expected to generate comparable bidder-specific
outcomes, which will be verified as part of our
validation.
To model each bidder type (Analyzer, Participator,
and Explorer) in terms of the above behavioral aspects,
we aggregate bidding data for bidders of the same type
across all auctions. Since bidder behavior is likely

Figure 2. Comparing average bidding frequency
functions for different bidder types

dependent on the current state of the auction, we want
to parameterize auction progress. Time is only one
possible indicator of an auction state (e.g., represented
as early, mid, and late portions of the auction), but it has
certain limitations. A point of time is not a consistent
indicator of auction progress (or auction state) across
different auctions. This is because the duration of
auctions varies significantly and mere passing of time
does not always translate into bidder activity; e.g.,
bidders may not place any bids for some period of time
during the auction. We propose to use auction revenue
as a proxy for time and discretize the temporal bidding
data based on revenue (revenue is increasing with time
in any auction). Auction revenue is a time-invariant
parameter that uniquely indicates auction state in the
CCA context. Note that information about the DL and
WL of any bundle is updated upon any new bid, and is
available from the auction framework to any bidder who
knows the current revenue.

3.1 Bidding frequency
To derive a dataset from which we can extract the
dynamic bidding frequency aspect, we use the following
steps to discretize and aggregate the experimental
baseline data based on revenue:
 Define a revenue binwidth parameter and specify a
width, e.g., 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ = $25.
 For each bidder, calculate the number of bids s/he has
placed within each bin’s revenue range; this is the
bidder’s bidding frequency at each revenue bin. For
example, if a bidder has placed four bids when auction
revenue is between $25 and $50 (i.e., within the 2nd
bin’s revenue range when using binwidth=$25), his
bidding frequency equals 4 for the 2nd bin.
 For each bidder type (A, P, and E), calculate the
average bidding frequency and standard deviation at
each bin by aggregating the bidding frequency values
of all same-type bidders for that bin. E.g., if three
Analyzers have the bidding frequency values of 4, 5,
and 6 for the 2nd bin, the average bidding frequency
value for Analyzers at the 2nd bin equals 5, with a
(bidding frequency) standard deviation of 1.
The result is average bidding frequency and standard
deviation series for each bidder type, which represent
how bidding frequency changes with auction state. To
model these three distinct bidding frequency patterns,
we fit a function on these series. For each bidder type,
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the function fitted on the average bidding frequency
series models the bidding frequency of a typical bidder
of that type. The function fitted on the standard
deviation series models the difference among bidders of
the same type. Since binwidth choice affects the
resulting series and fitted functions, the above procedure
is repeated for several different binwidth values ($10,
$15 … $40) and various fitting functions. The most
suitable parameterization is derived for each bidder type
based on goodness of fit and the expert-based
understanding of bidder behavior. The resulting
functions for the three bidder types are plotted in Figure
2. A linear fit is used for all standard deviation
functions, which represents a rough one standard
deviation confidence interval around the mean (the
confidence intervals are not shown in Figure 2).

3.2 Bundle selection
Bidders’ interest in different bundles depends on
their valuation for the items, which does not change with
auction state (is static). However, given the same
valuation scheme and identical focal items, the three
bidder types vary in their propensity to bid on different
bundles. For example, Analyzers are much more likely
to bid on a bundle that consists of all six items compared
to Participators and Explorers. To model the bundle
selection aspect, we use the aggregated bidding data
across all auctions for each bidder type and derive
discrete probability distributions that specify the
likelihood of a bundle being selected. We derive a
probability mass function for each bidder type. A
bidding agent determines which bundle to bid on by
making a random pick from its bundle selection
distribution given its focal item.

3.3 Bid amount
To model how much different bidder types bid on
bundles across different auctions, we need to take care
of the changing WL and DL of bundles as the auctions
proceed. We introduce a bid-level variable that
represents the amount bid on a bundle relative to the
bundle’s WL and DL, and calculate it for every bid as
following:
 If WL = DL: bid-level= bid-amount / DL;
 If WL > DL: bid-level=(bid-amount - DL)/(WL - DL);
 If WL and/or DL are not yet set for the bundle (i.e., in
the beginning of the auction), the initial bid-amounts
are used to establish separate starting-bid
distributions, which are used to determine an amount
for the first bids placed by bidding agents.
This bid-level variable allows us to meaningfully
analyze the bid-amount aspect of the three bidder types

Figure 3. Comparing average bid-level functions

across different auctions and across different auction
states. We discretize and aggregate the bid-levels we
have derived for each bidder type (using steps similar to
what we explained for bidding frequency) and derive
average bid-level and standard deviation series that
represent how bid-level changes with auction state. To
model the distinct patterns for the three different bidder
types, we repeat the process using several revenue
binwidths to derive the series, use various fitting
functions, and select the best fit (the approach is similar
to what we did for bidding frequency). The difference
between the resulting functions for the three bidder
types are shown in Figure 3. To model the difference
among bidders of the same type in terms of bid-level,
we use a linear fit on the standard deviation series.
A bidding agent determines the amount it bids on a
selected bundle by specifying a bid-level and knowing
the WL and DL for the bundle at any given auction state.

3.4 Agent-based auction simulations
Each of the three main aspects of bidder behavior
(bidding frequency, bid amount, and bundle selection)
are implemented in our agents as separate modules. The
fourth, bid-decision module determines the agent’s final
decision of whether or not to bid, after combining values
returned by the three above modules and considering the
agent’s bidding history so far. When an auction
simulation starts, each agent determines the expected
number of bids it is going to place at the current auction
state via its bidding frequency module. Each time an
agent intends to bid, it selects a specific bundle and a
corresponding bid-amount, as determined by its Bundle
Selection and Bid Amount modules. Based on the
agent’s valuation for the selected bundle, the intended
bid amount, and the bids placed so far, it decides
whether or not to place the current bid using its biddecision module. In experimental CCAs, the auction
ends when none of the bidders places a bid for an
extended period of time (e.g., 5 minutes). In the
simulation environment, we model this soft stopping
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rule by defining a non-activity parameter. When an
agent decides to not place the bid the non-activity count
is increased by one, which models bidders’ inactivity in
experimental CCAs as implied by effort that does not
lead to placing a bid. When the aggregate non-activity
count reaches a certain threshold the auction simulation
stops. The value for this stopping threshold models the
extended inactivity time that ends real auctions.

4. Data-driven validation of agent-based
simulations
In designing our bidding agents, we postulated that
three main aspects (namely, bidding frequency, bundle
selection, and bid amount) characterize different
bidding behaviors. In this section we verify whether our
bidding agents, built based on the aforementioned
assumptions, correctly replicate human bidders’
behavior under similar conditions (i.e., under the same
competition types) by statistically comparing outcome
variables generated by our simulation model with
outcome variables from experimental CCAs. We assess
the validity of our agent-based simulations in terms of
matched bidder-specific variables (Bids, Spans, and
Surplus) and auction outcome (revenue), by replicating
competition types observed in experimental CCAs,
namely APP, EPP, and PPP. Our approach follows the
recommended practices for verification and validation
of simulation models by leveraging the notions and
frameworks of model output behavior, point validity,
distributional validity, and pattern validity [7, 15-17].

4.1. Replicating bundle diversity and Bids
Figures 4 and 5 show the side-by-side comparison of
Bids (number of bids) and Spans (diversity of bundles)
variables between human bidders and bidding agents,
respectively. The horizontal axis indicates the human
bidder or bidding agent type (e.g., “E Agent” stands for

Figure 4. Comparing Bids variable between human
bidders and bidding agents

Figure 5. Comparing Spans variable between
human bidders and bidding agents

Explorer type bidding agents). We use t-tests, Wilcoxon
rank-sum (WRS aka. Mann-Whitney U) tests, and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests to compare the data
generated by our bidding agents in simulated auctions
with data from experimental auctions generated by
human bidders. When t-tests and WRS tests indicate no
significant difference, this provides evidence with
respect to point validity; i.e., the means and medians of

Table 2. Comparing bidder specific variables between human bidders and bidding agents
H0: Human = Agent
Kolmogorov
Wilcox Rank Sum
t-test
H: Human ≠ Agent
Smirnov
Comparing Human vs. Bidding Agent
W
p-value
T
p-value
D
p-value
of Type
Analyzer
25.5
0.277
-1.296
0.26
0.45
0.5095
Explorer
109.5
0.876
0.49
0.6394
0.395
0.3379
Bids
Participator
3325
0.2782
1.266
0.2128
0.125
0.7635
Analyzer
31.5
0.532
-0.73
0.5113
0.25
0.9853
Explorer
98.5
0.814
-0.243
0.815
0.295
0.7056
**
*
**
Participator
2096.5
0.0062
-2.499
0.0166
0.342
0.0026
Spans
P in APP 123.5
0.3146
-1.517
0.1703
0.5+
0.0713
Participators broken down by
P in EPP 269.5
0.3368
-0.832
0.4197
0.212
0.797
competition type
P in PPP 348.5*
0.0198
-1.814+ 0.087
0.387* 0.0476
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1
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the compared variables are not significantly different.
We also run two-sample KS tests to verify whether
variables generated by humans and bidding agents have
the same distribution. When the KS test does not show
a significant difference, this provides evidence with
respect to distributional validity for the compared
variable. Table 2 shows the comparison of Bids and
Spans variables between human bidders and bidding
agents of the same type. Validation in terms of Surplus
is excluded to save space; the simulation model
demonstrates pattern validity in terms of Surplus.
Based on these results, all three bidding agent types
generate comparable number of bids (i.e., captured by
Bids variable) as human bidders. Since none of the tests
show a significant difference in Bids for any of the three
bidder types, our simulation model has distributional
validity in terms of Bids. The bundle diversity (i.e.,
Spans variable) generated by Analyzer and Explorer
type bidding agents has the same distribution (as well as
the same mean and median) as Spans generated by
human bidders. Participator type bidding agents seem to
slightly differ from human bidders; i.e., Spans
difference is significant at the 1% level (p-values close
to 0.01 for all three tests). However, by looking at
Participator data broken down by competition, we see
that the difference in Spans is only marginally
significant when Participators compete against other
Participators (i.e., in auctions with PPP type
competition); there is no significant difference in Spans
between Participator type human bidders and bidding
agents in auctions with EPP and APP competitions.
Nevertheless, the relative difference in bundle diversity
among different bidding agent types always matches
those generated by human bidders.

4.2 Replicating auction outcomes
We compare auction revenue between simulated and
experimental auctions with identical competition types
to verify the similarity of auction-specific outcomes. We
use WRS tests to compare revenue between auctions
with different competition types in Table 3. The results
Table 3. Comparing auction revenue across
competitions observed in experimental auctions
Revenue in Competition of Type:
Experimental
APP
EPP
PPP
≈
<*
Auctions
Mean (stdev) 258 (141)
333.7 (66.6)
381.6 (49.9)
Auction
APP
EPP
PPP
≈
<***
Simulations
Mean (stdev) 468 (22.8)
463.4 (21.7)
482 (22.1)
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1,
≈ no significant difference

show that auction revenue has a similar pattern in both
experimental and simulated auctions (i.e., APP ≈ EPP <
PPP), even though average revenue is different between
experimental and simulated auctions with the same type
of competition. This difference is because our bidding
agents do not stop bidding pre-maturely as is the case in
a few experimental auctions with APP and EPP
competition type, as well as, the small sample size in
experimental auctions (as implied by the very large
standard deviation for APP and EPP in Table 3).
In summary, the validation shows that our agentbased simulation model has at least pattern validity
when we assess our model in terms of bidder specific
outcome variables (i.e., Bids, Spans, and Surplus) and
auction outcome (i.e., revenue). Pattern validity is
sufficient to leverage our model for studying dynamics
of bidder behavior and consequent auction outcomes
using agent-based simulations.

5. Leveraging bidding agents
Our agent-based auction simulations allow us to
explore the effect of competition on the dynamics of
bidder behavior and auction outcomes. Note that agents
are not explicitly programmed to behave differently
based on the competition they face. Instead, we are
interested in finding out whether the bidding dynamics
that result from different competitions, while the bidder
agents bid based on the coded canonical behaviors,
provide interesting insights into potential auction
outcomes through “emergent” behaviors of the agents
under different competitive environments. We run 100
auction simulations for each of the 10 possible
competition types (total of 1000 auction simulations) for
this part of the study, using the same valuation setup
used in experimental CCAs. Even though the simulation
platform allows us to run auctions with more than 3
bidding agents (e.g., 6 bidders), in this study we have
focused on running simulations with 3 bidding agents in
each auction so that the results can be compared with
results from experimental auctions.

5.1. Effect of competition on bidder behavior
Each bidder can face 6 types of competition based
on the composition of bidding strategies it encounters in
the auction, namely: AA (competing against two
Analyzers), AP (competing against an Analyzer and a
Participator), AE, PP, EP, and EE. Even if we assume
that bidders’ behavior is endowed, we can clearly
hypothesize that the type of competition a bidder faces
affects his/her behavior, including both the number of
placed bids (the Bids variable) and the diversity of
bundles bid on (the Spans variable). We use ANOVA
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Table 4. ANOVA of factors influencing bidding
agents' behavior and surplus
Bids
Spans
Surplus
F
F
F
Bidder Type 816.01***
1058.4***
46.1***
Comp. Type
54.4***
13.3***
11.1***
Bidder Type ×
Comp. Type

13.3***

14.8***

5.4***

R2
Adj. R2

0.7742
0.7956
0.1867
0.7729
0.7944
0.1821
F(17,2982)
F(17,2982)
F(17,2982)
=601.5 ***
=682.6 ***
=40.28 ***
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1

(see Table 4) to study how bidders’ own type, the
competition type they face, and the possible interaction
of these two factors affect each of these bidder-specific
outcome variables (Bids, Spans, and Surplus).
The models are highly significant (p-value ≤ 0.001) with
a high explanation of variance (adjusted R2 > 75%). This
tells us that bidding agents’ own strategy and the
competition type they face both significantly affect the
number of bids, the diversity of bundles they bid on, and
their economic welfare (as measured by surplus). The
significant interactions indicate that the effect of
competition type on agent behavior depends upon the
agent’s bidding strategy. We use interaction plots to
uncover the patterns of these interactions in Figures 6
and 7. Each point shows the group mean for a certain
agent type facing a specific competition (e.g., Analyzers
facing AP competition), and the error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. These plots provide a guideline for
further post-hoc tests to verify significant differences.
The general differences among the three bidding
agent types (Participator, Analyzer, and Explorer) in
Figure 6 are consistent with the differences among the
three bidding strategies observed in experimental CCAs
(Figures 4 and 5). To study these patterns, we use
pairwise t-tests and WRS tests (when we suspect nonnormal distributions) to compare Bids and Spans

between any two types of competition, for each bidder
type. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the mean values for these
variables under different competition types as well as
significant differences for each of the three bidding
agent types (when the t-test and WRS test results have
different significance levels, the less significant test is
shown). Figure 7 shows that Analyzers generally derive
the highest surplus and Explorers derive the lowest
surplus, irrespective of the type of competition they
face.
For Explorers, as the competition changes from AA
to AP to PP, there is a significant and consistent drop in
both the overall number of bids they place (Bids), and
the overall variety of bundles they bid on (Spans); see
Table 5. Interestingly, Explorers surplus drops and
becomes more negative (Figure 7) while we initially
expected Surplus to drop with Bids and Spans. This
implies that a single Explorer benefits from tougher
competition (i.e., AA) by losing less. Once there are two
Explorers in the competition, the third bidder’s strategy
doesn’t significantly affect Explorers’ bidding behavior
in terms of Bids and Spans (EP vs EE competition types)
unless the third bidder is an Analyzer (AE competition
type), which makes for a slightly tougher competition
where Explorers place slightly more bids on more
various bundles.
For Participators’, competing against two
Analyzers is the toughest they have the highest Bids and
Spans (Table 6), while having the lowest surplus, under
this competition (Figure 7). Competition intensity
reduces once one of the Analyzers is replaced by a
Participator. Bidding against PP or AE competition
types make for a moderate competition, based on
Participators’ Bids and Spans, but they make more
surplus under the AE competition. Participators place
the least number of bids on the fewest number of distinct
bundles when they bid against EP competition type,
while deriving higher surplus, which implies a weak
competition. Interestingly, bidding against two

Figure 6. Effect of competition on bidding agent behavior under different bidding strategies
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Figure 7. Effect of competition on bidder surplus

Explorers makes Participators place more bids on more
various bundles, probably in response to the frequent
random bids placed by Explorers on various bundles.
Analyzers are the most rational among the three
bidder types who make the most effort to place smarter
bids that maximize their surplus. Competing against two
Analyzers is considered the toughest competition other
bidders can face (including an Analyzer). The bidding
agents’ behavior supports this hypothesis, as indicated
by the highest Bids and Spans for all three agent types
when they face competition of type AA (see Figure 6).
Analyzers’ Bids and Spans both significantly decrease,
while their surplus increases (Figure 7) when one of the
Analyzers is substituted with a Participator. Analyzer
type agents place less bids when facing AE, PP, or EP
competitions compared to auctions with AP competition
type, but the variety of bundles they bid on (Spans) does
not significantly decrease (Table 7). Analyzers’ derive

the highest surplus when facing AE competition, where
both Analyzers are exploiting the random behavior of a
single Explorer. For Analyzers, EP competition is not
significantly different from AE and PP competitions in
terms of Bids and Spans, while it is the least intense for
Explorers and Participators. Competing against two
Explorers seems to confuse Analyzer agents as they
behave similar to when they face AA and AP
competition types, even though EE competition type is
expected to be less demanding. Under EE competition,
a Analyzer agents ends up placing more bids on more
various bundles trying to make sense of, and respond to,
the rather random behavior of Explorers and derive a
highly uncertain surplus (as implied by Analyzers fattailed surplus distribution under EE competition:
mean=15.7, median=1, skew=0.94, kurtosis= -0.39).
Our analysis of agents’ emerging behaviors provides
insights into human bidders’ probable behaviors under
similar competitions. Participation of Analyzers in an
auction generally makes for a tougher competition.
Other bidder types, including another Analyzer, place
more bids (higher Bids) on a wider variety of bundles
(higher Spans) in the presence of Analyzers. Explorers
generally make for a weaker competition. Other bidder
types, including another Explorer, generally bid less
frequently on less various bundles when competing with
Explorers. However, Explorers’ rather unexpected
behavior in terms of placing random bids on various
bundles can also confuse other bidders and makes for
more uncertain outcomes in terms of surplus. When the
majority of bidders are Explorer types, other bidders
(i.e., bidders facing EE competition type) can get
confused if they overanalyze Explorers’ random

Table 5. Comparing Explorer behavior across different competition types

Explorer Facing Competition of Type:
AA
>***
AP
>***
PP
≈
AE
>***
EP
≈
EE
62.04
56.64
49.98
51.37
45.655
45.303
AA
>***
AP
>***
PP
>+ AE
>***
EP
≈
EE
Spans
22.87
21.82
21.26
20.225
20.377
Mean 24.5
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1, ≈ no significant difference
Table 6. Comparing Participator behavior across different competition types

Bids

Mean

Participator Facing Competition of Type:
Bids
Spans

Mean
Mean

AA
32.72
AA
14.72

>***
>***

AP
26.19
AP
13.205

>**
>*

AE
23.39
AE
12.44

EE ≈
20.77
EE ≈
11.91

>*
≈

PP
21.457
PP
11.44

>***

EP
18.07
EP
10.845

>*

Table 7. Comparing Analyzer behavior across different competition types

Analyzer Facing Competition of Type:
Bids
Spans

Mean
Mean

AA
27.35
AA
11.01

>***
>**

EE
20.63
EE
10.59

≈
>**

AP
20.09
AP
9.645

>***
≈

AE
18.31
AE
9.77

≈
>+

PP
18.71
PP
9.32

≈
≈

EP
17.45
EP
9.52
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behavior and may place more bids on more diverse
bundles as a result, even though the competition is not
necessarily tougher. Analyzers, due to their more
investigative nature, are more likely to be affected in
this way than Participators. Participators are the
middle ground in terms of bidding frequency and bundle
diversity. They are less competitive than Analyzers but
more competitive than Explorers, without Explorers’
random bidding behavior. Their participatory behavior
can neutralize the effect of Analyzers’ competitiveness
and Explorers’ random behavior (e.g., in auctions with
APE competition).
Based on our analysis, we characterize competition
types as follows: AA – intense, AP – strong, PP –
consistent moderate, AE – uncertain moderate (or,
moderate but uncertain), EP – weak, EE – confusing
weak (or, weak but confusing); sorted by intensity and
uncertainty in decreasing order we have: AA, AP, PP,
AE, EP, and EE.

5.2. Effect of competition on auction outcomes
Our results in Table 8 indicate that bidding agents’
emergent behaviors under different competition types
lead to significant differences in auction revenue and
allocative efficiency. Table 9 shows the overall trend in
auction revenue across all different competitions as well
as results of pairwise comparisons using t-tests to verify
significant differences in auction revenue; Table 10
shows these trends and comparisons for allocative
efficiency. Auctions with PPP competition type, which
produce the highest auction revenue, also make for
consistently higher allocative efficiency, due to
Participators’ moderate behavior in absence of other
bidder types. Based on these results, we can argue that
Explorer agents’ random behavior provides other bidder
types a better opportunity to derive higher surplus. The
auctioneer derives the lowest average revenue in
auctions with EAA competition, where two Analyzer
agents derive the highest surplus by exploiting the
random behavior of a single Explorer agent. Under EEA
competition type, there is only one Analyzer agent who
exploits the randomness of Explorer agents, leaving the

Table 8. ANOVA for effect of competition types on
auction outcomes in auction simulations
Allocative
Auction Revenue
Efficiency
F
F
Competition Type
168.37***
51.764***
R2
0.3363
0.1348
Adj. R2
0.3343
0.1322
F(9,2990) =
F(9,2990) =
168.4 ***
51.76 ***
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1

auctioneer with relatively higher revenue (as compared
to auctions with EAA competition). Participator agents
can also take advantage of opportunities created by
Explorers (i.e., EPP and EEP competition types) but
cannot exploit them like Analyzers do (i.e., EAA, EEA,
and APE competition types). Analyzer agents not only
exploit Explorers’ random behavior but can also exploit
opportunities created by Participators (i.e., APE, PAA
and APP competition types). There is no significant
difference in Participators’ surplus when facing EP or
EE competitions which leads to a similar revenue in
auctions with EPP or EEP competition.

6. Discussion & Conclusion
The key contributions of this paper are three-fold.
First, we propose and design a data-driven approach for
developing software agents that are able to replicate
multi-faceted human bidder behavior in complex
decision environments of CCAs, which are important,
sophisticated market mechanisms that are becoming
increasingly used in various business applications. Our
study is the first to use an agent-based modeling
approach for this purpose. The validity of our agents is
demonstrated by replicating bidder specific variables
and auction parameters that were observed in
experimental CCAs with real users. Second, we
successfully leverage these agents to better understand
dynamics of bidder behavior and explore competition
types not observed in experimental auctions. The
simulations indicate how different competition types

Table 9. Comparing revenue across different competition types
Revenue under Competition Type
EAA <*** EEA ≈ APE ≈ PAA <* AAA <*** EEE <* EPP ≈ APP ≈ EEP
EEA
<*
PAA
EPP
≈
EEP
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1, ≈ no significant difference

<***

PPP

Table 10. Comparing allocative efficiency across different competition types
Allocative efficiency under Competition Type

EEA

<*

APE ≈ EAA <*** EPP ≈ EEE

≈

EEP ≈ PAA ≈ APP <* AAA <*** PPP
APP

EPP
<*
Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1, ≈ no significant difference
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affect auction outcomes, such as revenue, and show that
different bidder types are affected differently by the type
of competition they face in ways that are not always
intuitive. We analyzed bidding agents’ emergent
behaviors under different competition types and
explained the probable underlying mechanisms that lead
to these different behaviors and welfare outcomes. The
same arguments allowed us to consistently explain
differences in auction outcomes, which further supports
the consistency of our agent-based modeling approach
in simulating human bidder behavior. We would expect
actual bidders’ behavior to change consistent with our
agents’ emergent behaviors under similar competitions.
This understanding is necessary for possible customer
segmentation and market designs to attract different
participant types to certain auctions (designing incentive
mechanisms). And third, the capabilities of our
modeling approach allow us to design future
experimental studies to analyze how human bidder
behavior and auction outcomes are affected under
different competition scenarios. A unique outcome of
this work is that it enables controlled experiments where
human participants compete with software agents that
exhibit bidding strategies of our choice, which allows us
to address interesting questions that could not otherwise
be answered. For example, whether bidders’ behavior is
indeed endowed or learned? And if bidders can learn,
what are the most effective learning paths to encourage
certain types of behavior? Our proposed approach
provides unique opportunities to further our
understanding of bidder behavior in a complex,
competitive, and dynamic decision environment.
Our study has implications for the design and
implementation of combinatorial auctions in digital
marketplaces. We show how heterogeneity in auction
outcomes is (partly) driven by competition; for example,
certain competition types (i.e., composition of Analyzer
and Explorer type behaviors) lead to lower auctioneer
revenue as well as suboptimal allocative efficiency (i.e.,
low on average, with high variability). Auctioneers can
utilize this understanding to incentivize participants to
adopt different strategies (e.g., changing exploratory
behavior to participatory behavior) that would benefit
bidders as well as auctioneers. Moreover, participants’
experience in those auctions in terms of surplus and/or
the possible frustration from having a bad experience
(e.g., spending a lot of effort without winning the
desired items or unexpectedly deriving lower surplus),
as a result of the competition they face, can affect their
future decision of whether or not to participate in such
markets (e.g., affecting sustainability these markets).
Our findings can be utilized to design market
mechanisms that would discourage or prevent
exploratory behavior that leads to undesired types of
competition. Lastly, we also contribute to the design of

more user-centric artificial bidding agents by
developing software agents that demonstrate strategic
and human-like behavior in a complex market
environment.
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